PhD
student, Khmarskyi V. Y.
Poznan
University of Economics (Poland)
FINANCIAL INDICATORS OF BANK STABILITY
Since the establishment of
capitalism, a business that strongly depends on financial markets suffers from
unpredictable situations on the markets. It is enough to remember the Global
Financial Crisis in 2007-2008, which created unpredictable
fluctuations on the financial markets
and caused firms and banks to go bankrupt. As an example, Lehman Brothers
Holdings, Inc, one of the world’s leading investment banks, got huge losses on
the CDS market and could not fulfill its obligations. Bear Stearns Bank was in
the center of the mortgage lending crisis and needed additional financing. Some
would say that after 2010 the world’s economy became more stable, but the
recent downfall on the Chinese financial markets and the unstable European
financial market showed that the situation is still unsolved. That financial
crises occur so frequently may indicate that they are the components of
financial markets, and their negative effects are randomly distributed in time
and scale.
The rising frequency of financial
disruptions led to the emergence of new economic development forms that
decrease the predictability of development of financial markets trajectories.
Scientists, analysts, and businessmen – they all finally find the cause of
“wake up” components of the crisis, but “ex post” – after the market has passed
through a sharp and abrupt change in its trends.
In terms of financial security,
Ukrainian banking system is also vulnerable to global systemic risks that
affect financial stability of both Ukrainian banks and the whole Ukrainian
economic system. To secure Ukrainian banks, NBU have to elaborate effective
systemic approaches to analyze and prevent downfalls. However, it is important
to understand which factors play crucial role for analysis. In this way, we
have to consider not only regulations from Basel 3, but also local (Ukrainian)
regulations.
In terms of effective
macro-prudential indicators, we propose to apply such financial indicators, as
shown in Table 1.
Table 1. List of financial indicators for
macro-prudential regulation
Block |
Name |
Formula |
Capital adequacy |
The
scale of regulatory capital |
(regulatory
capital) / (minimum standard of regulatory capital) |
Capital adequacy |
The
adequacy of regulatory capital |
(regulatory
capital) / (assets, reduced by the amount of established appropriate reserves
for active operations) |
Liquidity risks |
Current liquidity |
(Assets
with a finite maturity of up to 31 days) / (the bank’s liabilities with final
maturity of less than 31 days) |
Liquidity risks |
Quick assets |
(Quick assets) / (total assets) |
Credit risks |
Big credit risks |
(The
sum of all large credit risks, provided by the bank with respect to all
contractors and all related parties) / (regulatory capital) |
Credit risks |
Maximum
credit risk to a single counterparty |
(The
requirements of the bank to the counterparty or group of related
counterparties and all financial liabilities issued by the bank with respect
to a counterparty or group of related counterparties) / (regulatory capital) |
Credit risks |
Share of substandard loans in all
bank credit portfolio |
(Provided substandard loans /
total sum of provided loans |
Credit risks |
Loans to deposits ratio |
(Provided loans) / (deposits) |
Financial stability |
Financial leverage |
(Liabilities) / (equity) |
Efficiency |
Return on equity |
(Net profit)/(equity) |
The adequacy of
regulatory capital reflects bank’s ability to perform in time and fully its
liabilities that result from trade, credit, and other monetary operations.
The scale of regulatory
capital shows the ratio of bank regulatory capital value to a minimum
established level.
Current liquidity shows
minimum value of assets the bank must have to perform in time and fully its
liabilities during one month.
Quick assets reflect
bank’s capability of transforming its assets into cash.
Variable “Big credit
risks” we use to restrict concentration of big credit risks for a single
counterparty or for a group of counterparties. Credit risk, taken for a single
counterparty or for a group of counterparties, is considered high when the
total liabilities to a single counterparty or to a group of counterparties
exceed 10 percent of a bank regulatory capital.
Maximum credit risk to a
single counterparty is used to restrict credit risk that emerges when
counterparty does not perform its liabilities.
Share of substandard
loans in bank credit portfolio reflects the extent of risk of credit operations
and perspectives of bank liquidity.
Loans to deposits shows the ratio of bank loan portfolio to deposit one, and
is an important indicator of long-term bank liquidity.
Financial leverage characterizes
bank’s capability of attracting new financial resources on financial markets.
Return on equity characterizes how effectively the bank uses
shareholders’ equity.
These indicators should be evaluated
in systemic way to evaluate bank’s financial position. Basing on appropriate
financial position, NBU may deffer “weak” banks from
“strong” and assess whether systemic risk is under control or not, and is it
possible to prevent future Ukrainian banking market disruption.
The list of references:
1.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011), “Basel
III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems”,
Bank for International Settlements, Basel, December.
2.
Diamond D., Rajan R. Liquidity risk, liquidity creation, and financial
fragility: a theory of banking / D. Diamond, R. Rajan // Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 109. – 2001. – Ð. 287-327.
3.
Goodhart C. A., Sunirand P., Tsomocos D. P. A risk
assessment model for banks / C. A. Goodhart, P. Sunirand, D. P. Tsomocos // Annals
of Finance, Vol. 1. – 2005. – Ð. 197–224.
4.
Boudt K., Daníelsson K. J., Koopman S. J.,
Lucas A. Regime switches in the
volatility and correlation of financial
institutions. Technical report, National Bank of Belgium. Working Paper
Research ¹ 227. – 2012, September.
5.
Danielsson, J.,
S. Shin H., Z. J. Endogenous
and systemic risk / J. Danielsson, H. S. Shin, Z. J. – Chicago,
IL : University of Chicago Press by NBER, 2013. – Ð.
73–94.